In this paper, we investigate a two-person zero-sum game with fractional loss function, which we call the two-person zero-sum fractional game. We are interested in a game value and a saddle point of the two-person zero-sum game and observe that they exist under various conditions. But, in many cases, it seems to be difficult to search directly for a game value and a saddle point of the fractional game. Thus, we study the existence and the properties of a game value and a saddle point for the game with the loss function including a parameter, which we call the two-person zero-sum parametric game. We show that, under various conditions, a game value and a saddle point of the parametric game with a special parameter are those of the fractional game.
Introduction
Recently, many concepts and terms about game theory have been introduced and have been investigated by many authors. Both individual stability and collective stability have been studied in practical game problems. In view of individual stability in two-person game, concepts of a game value and a saddle point in the two-person zero-sum game were introduced. Then, we are interested in a saddle point of the two-person zero-sum game, and the existence of a saddle point has been actively investigated under various conditions. We often observe two-person zero-sum games with fractional loss function in many economic problems. However, as far as we know, we think that there are few papers which treat such games.
In this paper, we study the existence and some properties of a saddle point for the twoperson zero-sum game with fractional loss function, which we call the two-person zero-sum fractional game. However, in many cases, it seems to be difficult to search directly for a saddle point of the fractional game. Because, even if two functions are convex or concave, the loss function constructing by fractional expression of them is not necessarily convex or concave. Thus, we consider a two-person zero-sum game with loss function including a parameter, which we call the two-person zero-sum parametric game. We study the existence and properties of a saddle point for the parametric game. For the analysis of the parametric game, the mini-max theorem in convex analysis plays an important role. Then, we show that under various conditions, a saddle point of the parametric game with a special parameter is that of the fractional game. Moreover, using a game value of the game with a special parameter with respect to E > 0, we show that there exists an &-saddle point of the fractional game.
This paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we formulate a two-person zero-sum parametric game and characterize a game value and a saddle point of the parametric game. Section 3 is the main part of this paper. Associated with the results of Section 2, © 2000 The Operations Research Society of Japan we discuss relations between the two-person zero-sum parametric game and the two-person zero-sum fractional game. Moreover, we show that there exists an &-saddle point of the fractional game.
A Two-Person Zero-Sum Parametric Game
We begin by describing a two-person zero-sum parametric game (GPe) by the following strategic (or normal) form:
(X, y, /,g, 09 Fe), where 1. X is a subset of a Banach space E, which is called the strategy set of player 1, 2. Y is a subset of a Banach space E, which is called the strategy set of player 2, Since there exist a mini-sup and a max-inf of the game under the conditions, the proof is given by Proposition 2.1.
We have the following minimax theorems and its corollaries for the game (GPe). From now, we will study some relations between the game (GPe) and the game (GP).
Using the parameter G given by (3.3), we consider the game (GP,) with the loss function such as
F , = f -g g :
that is, for each (x,y) G X X Y, F7(x,y) = f ( x , y ) -Sg(x,y). From the definition of 9 and (3.9), it follows that 9 $ 8. We arrive at a contradiction. Hence, it is proved that % > 0 holds.
Lemma 3.2 F_g has the following properties. (a)
is non-increasing with respect to 6 . Proof. Using & and Q_ instead of Fe and 0 respectively, we can prove this lemma by similar arguments to the previous one.
We have the following relations between the game (GPe) and (GP). 
xcx xex ycy
This shows that inf Fe* (X, y*) = inf sup Fe* (X, y).
xcx xex yâ‚
That is, y* is a max-inf of the game (GPg*'. Proof. Since Fe* > 0 and y* is a max-inf of the game (GP0*), it follows that 0 5 Fe* = inf sup Fe* (X, y) = inf FP (X, y*) < Fo*{x, y*), for all X G X, xex â ‚ xex which implies that for all X G X Therefore, we get that 0* 5 inf G(x, g*) 5 inf sup G(x, y) = Q*.
xex x^X yeY
This shows that y* is max-inf of the game (GP). From (3.12) and (3.13), it follows that 0 < sup inf Fg(x, y) = inf Fa(x, y*) < Fa(x, y*), for all X E X.
yâ‚ xcx x e x From (3.14), it holds that for all X E X, f <: G(x, y*). Consequently, we get -Q inf G(x) Y*) < sup inf G(x, y) = Q_.
x e x yâ‚ x^X
This shows that 6 = 0 holds.
(ii) Since Fe* >, 0 and y* E Y is a max-inf of the game (GPe*), from Theorem 3.2, it follows that y* is a max-inf of the game (GP). Thus, the proof of the theorem is completed. Then, i f 6 > 00, for any E > 0, there exists a point (X*, Y*) E X X Y such that Q* <: G(x*, y*) < Q* + E , where Q* is the value of the game (GP).
Proof. From Theorem 3.3, we have 9 = S. = Q*. Since Q* >. 0, it follows from Lemma 3.1 (g) and Theorem 2.1, that there exists y* G Y such that Fe* = K* = inf Fe* ( X , y*) >. 0. Then, from (3.15), we get that for all X E X , Fe* (X, Y*) > 0, that is, for all X 6 X Q* < G(x, y*). On the other hand, since 9 < Q* + E, it follows from Lemma 3.1 (f) that
